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 EDWARD A. TIRYAKIAN 
Rethinking Modernization: 
Legacies of Parsons and Hilbert 
Edward A. Tiryakian 
Duke University 
I Introduction 
It is a great pleasure for me to share with you some observations regarding rethinking a line of 
sociological analysis, really a perspective on social development, that had an initial vogue the 1950s 
until about the end of the 1960s. It then came under heavy attack from voices of the Third World 
- about which part of the world the analysis had been largely preoccupied - and under heavier attack 
still from a very different (or a seemingly very different) line of analysis in the 1970s. The latter 
alternative gained dominance in the United States in viewing societal development not as directed 
by goal-oriented actors, and not as a function of multiple factors interactive with each other, 
including cultural and political factors, but really as an unfolding "mega" process of world-wide 
capitalistic incorporation, which once achieved - and that achievement was just about completed -
would then make possible one further transformation: a global socialist overhauling of the capitalist 
engine. Readers will have readily recognized in these two modes of analysis (sometimes called 
"theories") what came to be called, respectively, "modernization analysis" and "world system 
analysis". They shared the spotlight of macroanalysis until the mid-1980s. 
What happened in Berlin in November 1989 (and its follow-up consequence of reunification the 
following year) was, needless to say, a world historic event: the breach in the Berlin Wall was 
equally a breach in much of the analyses of social change and social development that had prevailed. 
A breach in what a paradigm has laid out calls for rethinking at least some of the basic premises of 
that paradigm. The coming down of the Wall and other events of the 1980s prompted me at the 
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beginning of this decade to start rethinking our paradigm of large-scale societal development and 
societal change (Tiryakian 1991). The present paper, then, is a continuation and extension of this 
sociological cogitation. 
You will notice that first I mentioned "1989" but then I slipped in the phrase "events of the 
1980s". Are these the same? By "1989" I mean the unexpected sociopolitical events that shattered 
at least one major part of the Communist world, the Soviet Empire, and which registered at least a 
hypothetical "6 " or "7" on a sociological seismic Ritter scale in another part of that world, China.
1 
But by "the events of the 1980s" I mean, aside from sociopolitical events, the emergence in world 
recognition of the arrival of East Asia on the economic scene of globalization, that is, of the 
emergence in East and Southeast Asia of a new set of major players, with high growth rates, 
controlled inflation, a favorable balance of trade vis-a-vis already industrialized societies, and with 
this economic transformation taking place without increasing inequalities of income between the 
upper and the lower strata 
2 - in fact, growing income inequality has been more marked within 
Western societies that had made major claims of achieving "welfare states ". 
So, as we started the present decade, we had two anomalies that neither the earlier modernization 
analysis, nor its arch rival, world-system analysis, could incorporate in their presuppositions: the 
stellar economic performance of the East in comparison to the West and the internal collapse of the 
most advanced socialist system the world has known. In many instances, the "East" - and here I 
mean, let us be clear, predominantly the "core" Sinitic civilization societies (in particular, China, 
Japan, Korea, Taiwan) with their new "semiperiphery" (Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines) - did 
not use democratic political institutions, except for Japan.
3 The net result of the vast set of 
transformations that we have seen in the past ten years, and some of the earlier postwar (that is, post 
WWII) transformations is to offer a very large modern, if not contemporary, laboratory to 
reformulate how we approach societal development. I have started this line of analysis, in parallel 
with others (including Wolfgang Zapf and Klaus Müller in Germany, Piotr Sztompka in Poland, 
Rudolf Andorka in Hungary, Bruno Grancelli in Italy, Ronald Inglehart and Anthony Jones in the 
United States
4). I call it provisionally a "neo-modernization" perspective, but would welcome 
suggestions for a more glamorous or distinctive term: labels matter far less than what they signify. 
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II        Some Presuppositions 
Paradigms, theories, modes of analysis are interrelated; what provides a boundary or a frame for 
a given paradigm, its theories and modes of analysis are a set of presuppositions which, following 
Imre Lakatos (1970), function as positive and negative heuristics in guiding scientific inquiry. So 
in this vein, and without seeking to be in any way comprehensive but rather suggestive, let me 
advance some of the salient presuppositions of neo-modernization analysis, several of which relate 
to those of the earlier modernization paradigm, but not all. 
1.  By modernization will be understood the purposeful, reflective, intended upgrading of a 
unit or a set of units to increase the productivity of that unit, or in social terms, to increase 
the wantsatisfaction of concerned actors
5 and to increase the number of social actors con- 
cerned. 
2.  Modernization as a process of upgrading either a part of the societal whole or the whole its 
elf has thus to be relativized in time and space in that it is not something that happens in 
"modern" societies of the 19th and 20th centuries. Earlier periods also saw upgrading in 
units or component of units, upgrading which, in several instances, became institutionali- 
zed and long-term lasting.
6 Clusters of innovations facilitating upgrading in several spheres 
of human activity (and not just the economic) contribute to the formation of a geo-political 
center of modernity, where several aspects of modernization are taking place more or less 
at the same time. Again, there are no intrinsic features - certainly not those of the nature of 
the polity - that assure the permanence of a given center as having a "leading edge" in the 
ability to upgrade. 
3.  Neither processes of modernization in a given unit nor the set of units as a whole continue 
indefinitely, nor at the same rate. In some instances, upgrading may remain at a plateau, or 
it may decline. Likewise, a center of modernity may become stagnant, less innovative, and 
decline relative to other emergent centers.
7 
4.  Modernization is always a possibility for actors (but not a probability that it will occur or 
that it will occur as intended). The degrees of freedom available are greater than one (for 
otherwise this would imply a deterministic structure that acts independent of actors' decisi- 
ons), since actors can avail themselves in deliberate choices of the resources of the human 
and non-human environment. 
5.  The modernization of a total societal unit, that is, of all its major components, is a very rare 
event.
8 It is more likely that modernization proceeds unevenly throughout a societal whole.
9 
6.  Not only are the variables operative in processes of modernization interactive but particu- 
larly in the case of cultural as well as technological factors, their values in a given time pe- 
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riod may be volatile. In a related manner, a real factor in modernization is the intersubjecti-
ve complex set of attitudinal dispositions - or mentalités - which actors, both elites and non-
elites, bring to the "definition of the situation". These dispositions are significant intervening 
variables in enhancing or limiting the efficacy of human agency in bringing about desired 
change - they include such factors as the willingness of risk-taking, trust of others, 
(un)willingness to postpone gratification, and the like.
10 This socio-psychological "bundle" 
can function as a facilitator, as a detractor, or some combination thereof, for the intended 
modernization, particularly when the "bundle" becomes attached to broad-based social mo-
vements such as nationalism and religious revivals. 
7.    The intended upgrading and the intended course of development by actors are always sub-
ject to correction from unanticipated consequences and reactions by either other units of 
the societal complex and/or by external units. Modernization as an intended process is sub-
ject to contingencies that may or may not be provided for by the actors seeking to modernize 
a given unit or a system of units. 
The above are meant to suggest some of the tacit aspects of the approaches to development processes 
taken on by neo-modernization. There is a stress on the development capabilities of actors in a given 
system, there is a stress that societal systems cannot be reduced to a single parameter which 
determines their outcomes, and there is an acknowledgment that there are social costs as important 
as monetary ones involved in any attempt of changing existing arrangements. Stated somewhat 
differently, neo-modernization analysis gives a primary emphasis to multiple endogenous factors 
in providing impetus and resources for modernization, and among these factors we might mention 
those of human agency itself; that is, to invoke Parsons again, there is a "voluntaristic" frame of 
reference in viewing modernization as a (collective) form of social action. In more mundane terms, 
actors have the capacity to change for the better their situation by harnessing cultural values, 
environmental resources and institutional mechanisms, even though the actions undertaken may 
also produce unforeseen adaptive costs and strains. Societies - no less than individuals - have more 
than one "script" at their disposal, even if there has been an institutionalization of one to the 
detriment of others. 
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III   Modernity as a Setting of Surprises 
At the start I referred to the political implosion of the Soviet Empire and the economic explosion 
of East Asia (explosion in the sense of the region becoming a major actor in the global economy) 
as major societal transformations that were not anticipated in the paramount development models 
of social change. The Soviet case in particular has been the stimulus for an already vast amount of 
reflection and reinterpretation - and this should occupy not only historians of the Soviet Union, but 
also social scientists who are benefiting from the new climate of open research in the post-Soviet 
world from Eastern Europe to Siberia. It was the key background stimulus for a special focus in the 
May 1995 issue of The American Journal of Sociology. The focus was, as stated by the editor of the 
symposium, "whether events such as those of 1989 should - or could - have been predicted" 
(Hechter, 1995: 1521). 
The historian-sociologist Charles Tilly in regarding revolutions on a comparative basis opted for 
a relatively modest perspective that as a distinct phenomenon, they show coherence [Zusammen-
hänge] but only "in its variation and in its continuity with nonrevolutionary politics, not in any 
repetitious uniformity. Its sequences and outcomes turn out to be path, time, and situation 
dependent, not constant from one revolution to the next" (Tilly 1995: 1605). For Tilly, then, 
predicting revolution as exemplar of societal discontinuity is not really the mandate of sociology; 
what is appropriate and feasible is that we seek to account for why and how different societal settings 
produce "different varieties of forcible seizures of power over states" (ibid., 1602). 
The economist Tisnur Kuran introduced a strong reservation regarding predicting revolutions 
because in an authoritarian/totalitarian regime - we might say, in any other than a genuine 
democratic regime - there is no 1:1 correlation between what actors say in public and what they feel 
in private on any given issue. Consequently, in any given society, cognitive, economic, and social 
processes may be making it even easier to spark a revolutionary bandwagon without any sensing the 
potential for social change. The society may be on the verge of a massive explosion, therefore, with 
everyone continuing to believe - and indeed its members continuing to claim - that it is quite stable" 
(Kuran, 1995: 1533). He made a further observation that well needs to be heeded: 
Preference falsification is a problem not only for undemocratic countries. Even where the right 
to express offensive views enjoys legal protection, there exist sensitive issues on which people think 
twice before venturing an idea in public (1995: 1538). 
The third perspective in this symposium on anticipating/predicting the unexpected was voiced 
by Randall Collins who took the maximalist position, so to speak, that not only is prediction the 
raison d'être of sociology qua science but that in the case of the revolution of 1989, his own 
geopolitical theory had led him years before it occurred to predict the Soviet collapse although the 
theory did not offer "a theoretical basis for predicting what kind of regime would follow" (Collins, 
1995:1565). It certainly would be a tour de force for a sociologist who has not done primary research 
on Soviet societies to have had a much clearer crystal ball polished in neglected geopolitical theory 
that last flourished at the turn of the century. Neither modernization analysis nor world-system 
theorists had, to my knowledge, made such predictions in advance of 1989.
11 There are two 
difficulties with Collins' claim to predictive fame. First, my reading of his original pre-1989 pieces 
relevant for his argument showed that he had indeed discussed, in the context of geopolitical analysis 
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derived from turn-of-the-century figures like Mahan, Mackinder and others, the fate of the Soviet 
Empire but based on comparative discussions of other and older empires, what he "predicted" was 
that the Soviet Empire would decline in a period ranging from 50 to 300 years because it had become 
overextended! Somehow, the power of geopolitical theory is blunted by that temporal dimension, 
and I need not tell you that "decline" is hardly a synonym for "collapse". Moreover, some empires 
decline while their states endure (as in the case of the Spanish, French, and British empires), but the 
Soviet case entails in short order the collapse of an empire and the Soviet state. 
The second difficulty with Collins' analysis is that one could use the same geopolitical arguments 
of overextension of "marchland" areas to say that the United States structurally faces the same fate 
as the Soviet Empire. In fact, Collins briefly acknowledges one "competitor" for forecasting the 
implosion of the Soviet Empire, d'Encausse's insightful anterior studies of differential demogra-
phic birth rates in the Soviet Empire giving population advantages to ethnic minority groups, which, 
she argued, would weaken Russian hegemony that had constructed the Empire (d'Encausse, 1978, 
1991). Collins flips aside the possibility that the same fate awaits the United States, given similar 
differential birth rates between the traditional white population and the ethnic and racial minorities. 
He sees the superiority of the American system enabling it to stay indefinitely as a world power. In 
assessing present conditions, I am much less optimistic regarding the intermediate future, and I think 
there is as much empirical evidence to support this more guarded perspective as Collins adduces for 
his optimism. 
If I found the arguments of Tilly and Kuran more in keeping with "the evidence" than Collins', 
I also want to develop the point that sociology has to widen its horizon as to what constitutes large-
scale social change and the relation of large-scale social change to modernity. That is, we have to 
go beyond "revolution" as the focal point of sociological attention in respect of social change: it 
might be well if we started to think of "revolution" as part of a large set of "surprises" which may 
characterize our own period of modernity. 
Just what do I mean by "surprises"? I mean by this that if we take overall conditions that give 
a societal system a certain coherence at to, a "surprise" will be registered at t1, if the configuration 
(or structuration) differs significantly from what most observers and actors anticipate from to to be 
the prevailing conditions at t1. 
I have alluded to the sociopolitical transformation of Eastern Europe ,,1989" and to the 
socioeconomic transformation of East Asia. These were ,,big surprises" in terms of accepted models 
of social development. That a major contributing factor to the rapidity of the decline of Soviet 
hegemony was the resurgence of nationalism in Eastern Europe, in countries that had been 
"Russified" if not ,,Sovietized" was as much of a surprise for a Marxist historian such as Hobsbawm 
as it was for Gorbachev. Nationalism as a persisting force of modernity - and not as an anachronism 
of the pre-WWII European scene, but as a factor of social mobilization in both Western democratic 
societies and in non-democratic societies - has finally been given the attention it deserves,
12 which 
does not mean, of course, that it has been viewed favorably, because too much of the phenomenon 
is associated with its ,,dark side". The ,,dark side" has certainly been given prominence in the past 
four or five years because of other settings where ,,nationalism" is seen as a destabilizing force, the 
Transcaucasus and particularly ex-Yugoslavia, which 10 years ago was taken by various scholars 
as an exemplar of a viable multi-ethnic state.
13 If these are some of the most visible locales 
manifesting unexpected strength of nationalism and its variant, ,,ethnonationalism" (Connor 1994), 
there are many others, such as the October 1995 Quebec referendum which narrowly missed giving 
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the Quebec nationalists a mandate to begin proceedings of a ,,velvet divorce", the recent formation 
of a center-right Spanish government made only possible with the support of the nationalist parties 
of Catalonia and the Basque area (in return for new concessions of autonomy), and, still more 
recently, the Indian nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) receiving more seats than the long-
entrenched Congress Party (which had begun its career originally as a nationalist, anti-colonial pan-
Indian movement). 
Let me propose other "surprises" of our own recent modernity. Here I have in mind unforeseen 
qualitative shifts in the sociocultural and sociopolitical environment of the public sphere. The 
implosion of the Soviet world was completely unforeseen just 10 years ago, and perhaps we need 
to remind ourselves of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists in the past decade moving the hypothetical 
clock of Armageddon closer to "midnight" (or is it "high noon"?) shortly after not only Reagan's 
powerful war cry against "the evil Empire" but also the implementation of SDI and the deployment 
of Pershing missiles on German soil. For a little Gedankenexperiment, if in 1985 you had invited 
persons in either the United States, Germany or the Soviet Union to wager either that the Soviet 
world as such might no longer exist in 1995 but that the rest of the world would be intact physically, 
or that the Soviet world and the United States might mutually destroy one another in an accidental 
thermonuclear war before the year 2000, which wager would (reluctantly) have drawn the most 
bets? 
Now let me go back to the 1950s, the first "normal" decade after WWII. At one level, the decade 
itself was a very good surprise socioeconomically, in the United States, in Western Europe, in Japan. 
A global recession did not occur, which had been anticipated, and both "winners" and "losers" in 
the war made very rapid peacetime recoveries. Social scientists in the United States extrapolated 
from that setting a society marked by: (a) rather steady but not very exciting progress (economically 
and socially), (b) one following the lifecycle of "the organization man", with an "other-directed" 
character, echoing what Tocqueville had much earlier noted as the "conformist" aspect of modern 
democracy, American style, and (c) for good measure, the socio-religious-ethnic identity provided 
without much effort by simply being "Protestant, Catholic, or Jew". 
Unexpectedly, ten years later the sociocultural and sociopolitical scene was vastly different with 
new social movements, predominantly those of university-age youth, challenging institutional 
authority of every sort, with the counterculture, the drug culture, sexual revolution mixed in with 
a militant civil rights movement, and "revolution" becoming part of the daily discourse. Of course, 
this was very salient in the United States but by no means peculiar to it, since Germany experienced 
much of it, and the French student movement of May 1968 imported stimuli from both Berkeley and 
Berlin. 
This is not the place to discuss more fully the global aspects and significance of "1968", but my 
point is that this enormous set of cultural changes - which modernized many crucial aspects of the 
lifeworld and social conduct - was not anticipated in the social analyses and theories prevalent in 
the 1950s.
14 
In a complementary fashion, in the latter part of the 1960s, say from 1965 on, what social science 
theories and models anticipated the sharp turn to conservatism in the 1970s (and into the 1980s)? 
I mean more than the political conservatism that for nearly a quarter of a century has prevailed in 
Western countries.
15 I also mean the predominant turn to political and cultural conservatism of the 
younger adults. For some observers, this conservatism is to be deplored as manifesting a set of 
self-centered, hedonistic, "do-your-own-thing" values instead of communitarian or idealistic 
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values. Whether the changing economic climate of the past 10 years or so has seriously dampened 
the spirit of social initiatives that gave a momentum to the youth movements of the 1960s or whether 
we shall have in the early part of the new century/millennium another shift from conservatism to 
radicalism remains to be seen. 
Yet another "surprise" of our modernity has been the upsurge in the public sphere of religious 
"fundamentalism" in the United States, in Islamic countries, and in other cultural settings (Martin 
and Appleby 1991). Just as the transformation of a socialist societal complex into a capitalist market 
orientation was very unexpected in terms of models of economic development, so it might be said 
that the transformation of a secular public sphere in which the religious voice had been marginalized 
or moved to the outer periphery was equally unexpected in terms of a cultural development 
perspective stressing "secularization" as a necessary feature of modernization. And although 
"secularization" can refer to several conditions and processes, one overriding conception which had 
been accepted as a given in the dominant sociology of religion circles of the 1960s was the view that 
as modernity advances, religion becomes more and more "privatized", a matter of individual taste 
but not one of public concern, certainly not a basis for framing the political agenda. 
One last set of surprises merits mention. In the last two years we have had what I call "good 
surprises" in the form of peace initiatives in three settings that had been marked by extreme ethnic 
conflict: Northern Ireland, Israel and Palestine, and South Africa. To be sure, peace initiatives are 
not the same as peace settlements, but that such initiatives have taken place, however long, arduous, 
and full of bumps the road may be, is still a very net gain in the 1990s from the conditions in each 
of these settings in previous decades, marked by chronic violence. 
If I have spent some time discussing "surprises" - good and bad ones - it is because I think a rich 
research agenda for neo-modernization analysis is the comparative study of the surprises of 
modernity, so as to provide us with perhaps a more adequate theorization of modernity.
16 Certainly, 
Germany is a propitious sociological soil for the study of surprises and modernity, having had more 
than a fair share of "bad surprises" in the dim past and more recently of "good " ones. 
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IV      The Legacies of Parsons and Hilbert 
In my final section of this paper, I would like to invoke the names of two major theorists, who should 
be of particular significance to a German audience, although their relevance for my discussion 
transcends national consideration. 
Talcott Parsons is an apt choice because his theoretical writings provided a core theoretical 
grounding for much of modernization analysis; and his "German connection" is one that stretched 
from the beginning of his academic career at Heidelberg, where he "discovered" the spirit of Weber, 
to the very end, when he died peacefully in Germany after receiving an honorary degree at 
Heidelberg. But what is the legacy in the context of my discussion? It is essentially twofold. 
First, although one may say that his analyses dealt predominantly with the complex functional 
differentiation of systems of action into sub-systems, Parsons was well aware that there is an obverse 
or a reciprocal problem of social order, and that is the question of integration (Parsons 1960). The 
sphere of "value-consensus", the dynamics of what he termed the "L" (for "latency") cell did not 
get as much treatment. Today, the situation of the United States in particular, but that of many other 
societies as well where the problematics of national identity revolve in a very critical way in the 
separation of a "significant other"
17 from the "nation" - that is, where the solidarity of the societal 
community is becoming increasingly challenged by centrifugal forces of fragmentation and so-
called "identity politics" calls for urgent theoretical and practical attention be given to the question of 
integration. One possible result of the lack of integration is the disintegration of the societal 
community, and we have in Europe instances of variations in disintegration: the "velvet divorce" 
of the (ex-) Czechoslovakia Republic that had held together after WWI; the "separation" without 
formal divorce of the Flemish and the Walloons; and the acrimonious divorce and disintegration of 
another post-WWI construct, Yugoslavia. The "integration" of other nation-states should not be 
taken for granted, for I am convinced we live in a period where the decoupling of "nation" and "state" 
is widely taking place and cannot be assumed to be a "given". It is part of the legacy of Parsons, I 
would reiterate, that we give theoretical attention based on comparative analyses to the question of 
"integration". 
For Germany, "integration" poses a triple challenge of modernization: the integration of 
Germany into the European Union, the integration of non-German immigrant populations (especi-
ally the second and now the upcoming third generation) into the educational, cultural and political 
mainstream of Germany, and lastly but perhaps most importantly, the socio-psychological integra-
tion of Eastern Germans to feel "at home" in a new Germany; this also entails a modernization of 
thinking on the part of Western Germans that East and West must be on the same plane to do "nation-
building" for the 21st century together, collaboratively. 
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David Hilbert needs as little introduction to a German audience as Parsons, but to an audience of 
mathematicians, rather than social scientists. Hilbert, who as a child breathed the same air of 
Königsberg as had Kant 100 years before, was acknowledged at the turn of this century as one of 
the world's greatest mathematicians.
18 Hilbert was part of the German delegation to Paris for the 
great International Exposition of 1900, and because of his stature was given the task by his 
colleagues of preparing the keynote address for the Second International Mathematical Congress, 
which attended the Exposition. Hilbert prepared a paper that, in its published version, contained 23 
"problems" that taken together gave coherence to mathematics as a single field; he specified what 
constituted a "problem" in terms of general criteria: it should be clear and easily comprehended, it 
should be difficult yet not completely inaccessible, and it should be a guidepost to hidden truths 
(Hilbert 1976). In formulating the specific problems as he did, Hilbert enabled a most important 
stocktaking or inventory of the empirical knowledge of mathematics, of what was known and what 
had to be addressed. The posing of the problems provided the field of mathematics with a sense of 
wholeness and provided its practitioners with concrete challenges of seeking to solve them. I would 
propose that Hilbert's general criteria for stating a problem as well as formulating a list of problems 
to signal what a scientific field has done and needs to do are very much relevant for rethinking 
modernization analysis, and more broadly, dynamic macrosociology. 
As we head into another turn of the century - or even more, into a turn of the millennium - to draw 
a list of "problems" which interrelate the social sciences, in terms of what we know and what we 
do not know, particularly regarding Development", seems to me to be an endeavor of the highest 
importance.
19 No small part of the challenge of this undertaking is that we do so by ,,bracketing" 
ideologies regarding causal factors as to what are development paths and their endstates. 
This is also where another legacy of Parsons converges with Hilbert's. Because 50 years ago this 
year, Parsons brought together a restructuring - yes, a modernization - of the training of sociologists 
by chairing a new department of "Social Relations" which brought together under one administra-
ting and training roof, sociologists, social psychologists, clinical psychologists, and social anthro-
pologists. It was an unparalleled effort at the integration of disciplines so as to develop a common 
analytical language and a common mode of analysis of "the human condition". Much was 
accomplished, including the stimulus for a great deal of the interdisciplinary aspects of moderniza-
tion analysis. But unfortunately, Social Relations was not permanently institutionalized, and after 
20 years, it "imploded", not as violently as the Soviet Union, but just as much at its level. 
Today, I would say, the various "real world" parameters and conditions, including the emergence 
of globalization in various spheres, and not just the economic one, are producing interesting and 
challenging mixtures of "order" and "chaos". I don't think the training imparted in most departments 
- at least the ones in the United States with which I have some familiarity - are adequate, either to 
specify the key "problems" of our disciplines, or to provide provisional answers to pressing, urgent 
problems of our own phase of modernity, including several problems of "integration". To be more 
specific, a critical problem for the social sciences, following the inspiration of what Hilbert posed 
for mathematical sciences, would revolve around the problem of trust. Trust has begun to receive 
the theoretical and empirical attention it deserves as a key aspect of the social order, and even as a 
variable, for example in the transition or maintenance of democracy (Barber 1980; Eisenstadt 1995; 
Fukuyama 1995; Misztal 1996; Sztompka 1996). What we need to establish empirically and 
comparatively is something like this: under what conditions can trust, damaged by actions of A 
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toward B, be rebuilt? "Distrust" and "mistrust" are extremely corrosive of the social fabric, and the 
greater the level of distrust, the greater the social costs for all parties and their societal system as a 
whole. 
In the United States, "trust" in government is at a dangerously low ebb,
20 and "trust" of blacks 
and whites regarding the judicial system in cases involving both has also declined to a similar low 
level. Is it possible for the two communities to rebuild trust? Is it possible for Muslims in Bosnia 
to rebuild trust in their Serbian neighbors after what they have been through? Is it possible for 
Palestinians and Lebanese to trust Israelis after murderous bombing raids? Is it possible for Israelis 
to trust Arabs after wanton terrorist attacks? Is it possible for Afrikaners to trust the new ANC 
government in South Africa? Needless to say, trust is a reciprocal relationship and if A comes to 
mistrust or distrust B, that implies the same on the part of B. If we tour the world today, we find that 
the condition of "trust" has become an important domestic or internal question for a great many 
societies. I doubt that there is a single answer regarding how to rebuild trust, but it seems like an 
empirical phenomenon with much variability, one that I think is as interesting and probably more 
fruitful for social scientists to study today than the fetish with "revolutions". 
I stated that I didn't think our present graduate training programs are adequate to deal with "trust" 
or related broad aspects of our evolving global reality and its mixture of "order" and "chaos". 
Departments in the social sciences tend to have boundaries that may provide some depth but also 
limit horizons. There are, to be sure, some models that aspire to be general theories which link 
scholars in several disciplines; the one enjoying large success in the United States is "rational 
choice", a "modernization" of classical utilitarian theory. I cannot get very excited about it as a mode 
of accounting for societal changes since it makes no room for the cultural matrix of social action, 
for culture as a variable, nor for changes in sentiments, nor for personality as a variable in social 
situations. Its accounts of real world changes are more ad hoc, ex post facto explanations. But in any 
case, what would be in my judgment most desirable is some sort of renovation of an interdisciplinary 
"social relations" program for graduate studies, one in which sociology, comparative history, 
cultural studies, and a broad spectrum of psychology would be a core cluster, but with exposure to 
other fields such as political economy, and, for advanced students, even comparative civilizational 
analysis (Eisenstadt 1986; Huntington 1996). I admit this may be very difficult to implement, since 
the original "Social Relations" came into being under circumstances that might not be reproduced 
today, including the fact that it started shortly after the end of a war, when sometimes "fresh 
beginnings" are easier. Perhaps the emerging "age of globalization" (Albrow 1996) with new 
challenges to understand "global - local" relations and their dynamics, will be the spur for seriously 
undertaking the "modernization" of graduate training in the social sciences. 
I close by asserting that rethinking what are the problems of our several disciplines - what we 
do know, what we don't know, what we might be able to know - and rethinking creative ways of 
dealing with these problems is to make capital use of the joint legacy of Parsons and Hilbert. And 
since I prepared this communication in Germany, perhaps it is apt to close with Hilbert's own words: 
 
Wir werden wissen.  
Wir müssen wissen. 
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Notes 
1.  It might be added that "1989" - just as "1968" - is both a year but also a period around the year. For 
the vast sociopolitical transformation and ultimate implosion of the Soviet world, "1989" really 
began shortly after the accession of Gorbachev as Party Secretary and it closed with the formal 
dissolution of the Soviet Party in 1991. Similarly, "1968" was a climax, at least in the United States, 
to the rapid sociocultural and sociopolitical movements that began to take over the landscape of the 
public sphere during the Johnson administration and which did not wind down until well into the 
Nixon administration. 
2.  As indicated, say, by a Gini-coefficient index of inequality. 
3.  I mean post-WWII Japan with its parliamentary system and demilitarization. 
4.  For representative collective works, see Zapf (1990) and Grancellli (1995). 
5.  Ultimately, "upgrading" translates into improving the quality of life in various sectors of the human 
condition. It does not refer solely to economic conditions, but to political, cultural, and social ones as 
well. I do not argue that such upgrading is a continuous unfolding, which attached the first formulation 
of modernization analysis to the "progress" paradigm of the 19th century. Nor, on the other hand, do 
I see "downgrading" as the underlying process of modernity, which might obtain from certain Mar- 
xist and post-modern perspectives, respectively. 
6.  What is more a related supposition than presupposition since it is subject to empirical verification is 
that an intended upgrading of all units or sectors of a societal system and at the same time only 
begins with the French Revolution (in the first few years of the First Republic) and thereafter appears 
on a few limited occasions. 
7.  Just what is the territorial demarcation of a center needs greater specification. Nation-states have 
usually been taken as units of comparative analysis, which might lead us to treat a center as a country. 
However, it should be taken into account that a center may be a region within a country acting as a 
pole of innovation and attraction for the rest of the country, as well as for populations outside, or the 
center may be a broader territorial cluster of societies in relative propinquity to one another. To 
illustrate, Italian city-states formed a center of modernity in the 14th and 15th centuries, while the 
Paris-London-Berlin "triangle" might equally bee taken as a center of modernity for the period 1880- 
1910. 
8.  I would say there are a few societies that seemed to upgrade all their components - economic, cultural, 
political and technological - with the 19th century offering perhaps the greatest concentration of 
such, as in the cases of Great Britain, Germany, France, Japan, and the United States. 
9.  Indeed, it might be argued that by placing an emphasis, or a societal priority, on one sector, deficit 
attention attends other sectors, which will show up as societal problems subsequently. For those 
familiar with the Parsonian A-G-I-L schema of societal functions, this presupposition serves to indicate 
that if priority is set on economic development and technical efficiency (the "A" cell), shortages may 
occur in the "I" cell. Or, if high emphasis is placed on value-consensus ("L"), as in today's 
fundamentalism, economic development will be deprived. The Soviet system seems to have been a 
situation where a high emphasis was placed on the political/ideological factor ("G") over economic 
considerations; when Gorbachev sought to modernize the system via economic restructuring, deficits 
in the "L" and "G" sphere became evident. 
10.  Parsons' "pattern-variables" presented some of the subjective orientations of "self to "other" as 
variables that typify modernity. In recent years, important cultural and political changes may lead us 
to question the association of some patterns as necessarily "modern". Thus, the return of "mechanical 
PAGE 12 EDWARD A. TIRYAKIAN 
solidarity", albeit in a "modern "form in both advanced modern "democratic" societies 
(particularly the United States with ethno-racial and gender identities) and not-so-
industrialized or democratic ones, or the efficacy of "collectively orientation" as a positive 
factor in the economic development of East Asia, suggest that modernization does not have a 
necessary pairing or cluster of "modern" (in this context, the variables of "achievement" and 
"self-orientation) in contradistinction to "traditional" value-orientations. What needs to be 
emphasized is that advanced modernity may well entail a pluralism in value-orientations, on 
the one hand, and on the other, a modernization of at least some "traditional" value-
orientations. Again drawing on the United States, "affirmative action programs" were enacted to 
promote the incorporation of minority groups into the larger society, but these programs were, in 
effect, giving weight to "particularism" over "universalism". 
11.  For that matter, in going over various leading public affairs journals published in 1990, I have 
not found articles anticipating that Russia would turn its back on Communism and that the 
Communist Party would dissolve itself. Things happened at an incredible rate of change from 
1988-1991, and one expert's guess was as good as the next. 
12.  The attention does not come just from scholars and intellectuals, but also from practical 
politicians. Although all parties other than the "extreme right" shun the label "nationalist", most 
parties in France, for example, have coopted a key emphasis of LePen's Front National demand 
for making France for the French" by severely restricting immigration and immigrant benefits. 
13.  In a similar vein, in the 1970s Lebanon was hailed as a successful Middle East exemplar of 
Lijpart's "consociational democracy". 
14.  The leading theorist of the 1950s, Talcott Parsons, had in some essays (on Germany and on 
race relations in the United States) discussed the strains on a system brought about by 
modernization. In the case of Germany in the 1930s, the strain had proven too heavy; in the 
case of the United States, the value-system and institutional commitment, Parsons felt, were 
sufficient to provide an upgrading of the condition of blacks without changes in the nature of 
the polity. In a sense, Parsons' analysis has, until now, proven to be a better understanding of 
the dynamics of American society than that of his radical detractors in the 1960s. 
15.  I would also include in this the administrations of Mitterand in France and Gonzalez in 
Spain - socialist in name, but overall conservative in action. 
16.  As I understand it, Ulrich Beck's discussion of modernization in terms of risks (Beck 1986) 
should be very congruent with the above discussion of modernity as a setting of surprises. In 
a sense, all endeavors at upgrading, which is a key feature of processes of modernization, entail 
a certain level of risk; perhaps the ultimate risk in a global civilization of modernity is not to 
seek modernization, that is, to seek to keep the various parameters of the A-G-I-L and their 
interchanges "frozen". 
17.  It should be obvious that the "significant other" I intend is not that of George Herbert Mead. I 
am talking about blacks as "significant other" for whites and reciprocally in the United States; 
of Turks and "Ossies" for "Germans"; and reciprocally, of Russians for Latvians in Latvia and 
reciprocally, 
and so on. 
18.  My source materials for Hilbert comes from the excellent biography of Reid (1986). Hilbert's 
rival for preeminence in mathematics 100 years ago was the equally renown French Poincaré. 
Inter alia, the national rivalry between the two had an interesting parallel in the contest for 
discoveries between the French Pasteur and the German Koch in the field of microbiology. 
19.  For a complementary discussion of social problems, see the recent article by Neil Smelser  
(1996). 
20.  This is typified by presidential aspirant Robert Dole early in the 1996 presidential campaign 
making public statements that he would not trust President Clinton to babysit with a child (and 
not because the president's saxophone might keep a child awake!). 
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